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Following a review of principal-agent theory and previous research, a section is devoted to the explanation
of the model that is utilized in this paper.
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CEO Compensation and Firm Performance—
Are They Related?
Barb Kube
What do IBM, Sunbeam/Oster, Westinghouse Electric, Time
Warner, General Motors and American Express all have in common?
In the past year all of these companies have acquired new chief
executive officers (CEOs) (Saporito, p. 10). These changes are
just a small example of the growing power of disgruntled
shareholders. Upset at increasing wealth of CEOs in the face of
poor or stagnant corporate performance, shareholders are speaking
out, and they aren't the only ones. This controversy has also
prompted the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to enact
stricter guidelines for proxies. Additionally, movements to
enact compensation-limiting legislation have been initiated by
several members of Congress. Alternatively, it can be argued
that well-structured compensation packages, by increasing CEO
incentives, actually benefit shareholders.
This paper attempts to assess the ability of compensation
packages to affect firm performance. Following a review of
principal-agent theory and previous research, a section is
devoted to the explanation of the model that is utilized in this
paper. Both theoretical and empirical models are outlined. The
next portion reports the results of the statistical testing of
the model. Finally, this paper addresses the "real-world"
implications of its findings.
I.

LITERATURE REVIEW

At the heart of the debate surrounding CEO compensation is a
classic principal-agent problem. Economists theorize that a
principal-agent problem arises whenever there are incentives for
the agent to pursue interests that differ from those of the
principal. In this case the CEO (agent) may be tempted to
maximize his/her personal utility, as opposed to maximizing
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shareholder (principal) wealth. Adam Smith expressed such an
opinion of non-owning corporate executives in The Wealth of
Nations:
Being the managers rather of other people's money than
of their own, it cannot well be expected that they
should watch over it with the same anxious
vigilance.... Negligence and profusion must always
prevail.(Wechsler, p. 211)
Thus, it would seem that the principal-agent problem arises as
CEOs become less dependent upon corporate performance for their
income. Acting as key decision-makers, but without having a
personal stake in the performance of the company, CEOs can
benefit and prosper even when the corporation performs poorly.
Enter the era of pay-for-performance compensation programs.
Leonard asserts that,"by 1985 long-term incentive plans had been
nearly universally adopted by large corporations" (Leonard, p. 13S ) . This course of action is aimed at reconciling the interests
of the CEO with those of the shareholders by tying executive pay
to some measure of firm performance. As compensation becomes
more performance-based, both the expected cost of the
compensation package and the expected performance of the firm
increase. Therefore, the theoretical solution to the principalagent problem lies in establishing an equilibrium between the
value of an incremental change in corporate performance and the
value of an incremental change in CEO compensation (Abowd,
p. 53-S). While it may sound simple, measuring compensation can
be tricky.
First, firm performance can be measured by either
accounting, economic or market measures. Return on assets (ROA)
and return on equity (ROE) are both accounting measures; aftertax gross economic return (ERET)is an economic measure of
profitability; and total shareholder return (TSR) is a market
measure of firm performance. All of these examples are expressed
as percentages. Even though ERET is the best measure of
profitability, it is often difficult to find the necessary data
with which to calculate this measure of performance.
Aside from performance measures, there are many components
of compensation packages that must be considered: salary, bonus
payments, stock options, payments from long-term compensation
plans, restricted stock awards, thrift-plan contributions,
company-paid health and insurance plans, auto allowances and
other executive "perks." It is not always easy to determine how
much and in what form a CEO is being compensated. Thus,
examining the relationship between compensation and firm
performance can be quite involved.
In the real world there appear to be numerous examples in
which poor corporate performance is accompanied by increasing CEO
compensation. In light of such evidence, one might wonder how
well these compensation programs are achieving their objective.
Recent research conducted by Michael C. Jensen of Harvard
University and Kevin J. Murphy of the University of Rochester
analyzes the sensitivity of total CEO compensation to firm
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performance for the years of 1974-1986 (Jensen, pp. 226-227).
They used regression analysis to compute the sensitivities for
the individual components of compensation packages, including
base salary, bonus and stock options. Additionally, they
compared the various sensitivities
for large versus small
companies (Jensen, p. 260J1.
Of particular interest is the regression equation that tests
the overall sensitivity of CEO wealth [TC=TP+pv(S+B)] to
changes in shareholder in shareholder wealth (reproduced
from Jensen, p. 229):
TABLE 1. Estimates of Pay-Performance Sensitivity: coefficients
of Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of CHANGE(SALARY+BONUS),
CHANGE(TOTAL PAY), and CHANGE(PAY-RELATED WEALTH) on CURRENT and
LAGGED CHANGE(SHAREHOLDER WEALTH)—in thousands of 1986 constant
dollars.
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

change
(SALARY
+BONUS)

change
(SALARY
+B0NUS)

change
(TOTAL PAY)

Intercept

31.7

30.8

36.6

TOTAL PAY+
[change
(SALARY+BONUS)]
918.0

Change SHW

.000014
(8.0)

.000014
(8.4)

.000024
(5.2)

.000197
(9.7)

.000008
(5.5)

.000009
(2.4)

.000103
(5.8)

Change SHW,
year (t-1)
R2

.0082

.0123

.0041

.0157

Estimated
payperformance
sensitivity
b

.000014

.000022

.000033

.000300

F-statistic
for b

64.0*

93.0*

28.5*

117.7*

Sample size

7,750

7,688

7,688

7,688

Note-The sample Is constructed from longitudinal data reported In Forbes on 1, 688 CEOs serving In
1,049 firms for the years 1974-86. Change(SHW) Is defined as the beglnnlng-of-perlod market value
multiplied by the Inflation-adjusted rate of return on common stock, t-statistics are in parentheses.
'Significant at the 0.01 percent level.
The Forbes definition of total compensation typically includes salary, bonus, value of restricted
stock, savings and thrift plans, and other benefits but does not include the value of stock options granted
or the gains from exercising stock options.
Present value based on the assumption that the CEO receives salary and bonus increment until age 70 at
a discount rate of 3 percent.
Estimated b is the sum of the coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged shareholder wealth change.

Results of Jensen and Murphy's study revealed that bonuses
were the least sensitive to changes in firm performance (Jensen,
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p. 262). Overall they estimated that:
...[T]he total pay-performance sensitivity—including
both pay and dismissal—is about 75 cents per $1,000
change in shareholder wealth for the full sample
(45 cents and $3.15 per $1,000 for large and small
firms, respectively).(Jensen, p. 261)
Based on these results, they concluded that annual changes in
executive compensation are not significantly responsive to
changes in corporate performance.
Suppose that studies like that of Jensen and Murphy
establish that pay is based on performance. This result would
not, by itself, guarantee that higher pay is an effective
incentive. To decide that question, we need to know not the
effect of performance on pay, but the effect of pay on
performance.
Bhile the Jensen^Murphy study did not address the issue of
whether or not firms are able to^design compenFation: packages
that positively influence future performance, Cornell
.University's John Abowd did just that. Dr. Abowd used data from
1981-1986 and tested to see if corporate performance depends on
executive compensation programs. More specifically, he wanted to
know if the composition of compensation packages elicits specific
behavior from the agents. Using OLS regression analysis, he was
able to estimate the ability of compensation plans to affect
corporate performance during the next time period (Abowd, p. 52S ) . Abowd tested four different measures of corporate
performance: after-tax return on equity (ROE), after-tax return
on assets (ROA), after-tax
gross economic return (ERET) and total
share-holder return (TSR)2.
Abowd's most compelling work involved the performance
equation of his continuous model, which was designed to,"focu[s]
on the conditional expectation of future corporate performance
given an elaborate, nonlinear function of current performance and
compensation (Abowd, p. 52-S)". For a dependent variable, he
used the conditional expectation of the four performance
variables: ROE, ROA, ERET or TSR. Independent variables
included the current performance measure (calculated in the same
manner in which the dependent variable was figured), current
adjusted J.og of jtqtal salary, total assets at the beginning of
the year and two interaction terms^ that combimed^expected^ future
performance with current compensation (1) when current
performance was below average and (2) when current performance
was above average. The model was further tested by substituting
the bonus as a percentage of base salary for total salary in the
interaction terms and substituting base salary for total salary
in the log variable (Abowd, pp. 52-S, 62-S, 66-S, 67-S). (See
Table 2)
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TABLE 2.

Performance Equation for Abowd's Continuous Model
Dependent Variables
PERF(t+l)

Independent Variables3
PERF(t)
In TOTAL SALARY(t)
TOTAL ASSETS
PERF(t) * COMP(t);
PERF(t)>median
PERF(t) * COMP(t);
PERF(t)<median

ROE and ROA, accounting measures of profitability, were not as
sensitive to CEO compensation as were ERET, an economic measure
of performance and TSR, a market measure of corporate
performance. However, Abowd conceded that a bias against the
accounting measures of performance may have been present because
he excluded multi-year plans of compensation from his study;
multi-year plans are generally based on ROE and ROA. Even so, he
concluded that basing compensation on, or increasing
compensation-sensitivity to ERET or TSR "...may be associated
with better performance on that measure in the future" (Abowd, p.
68-S).
II. MODEL
Combining the empirical techniques used by Abowd, the
measurement methodology of Jensen and Murphy and principal-agent
theory will hopefully provide additional insight into the
controversies surrounding CEO compensation. Particular attention
is paid to the ability of firms to influence future performance
through their CEO compensation packages. To begin, the list of
factors that influence firm performance for any given year is
seemingly endless. Some of the dominant variables include: the
state of the economy, the financial position of the firm at the
beginning of the studied year, management and firm performance in
the preceding time period. Thus, performance can be expressed as
the following:
PERF(t) - f(SOE, Assets, CEO comp, PERF(t-l))

Various measures of performance exist. Using performance
measures such as ROE, ROA, ERET and TSR, which are expressed as
percentages can help avoid biasing results against small firms
just because they deal in smaller monetary transactions. A
complete analysis would evaluate accounting, economic and marketbased measures.
Measuring assets helps to account for size differentials
between firms—those with more assets are likely to have higher
total compensation packages for CEOs, and the CEOs are less
likely to own a significant percentage of the outstanding stock
(the firm will probably have a larger number of stock shares
outstanding). The most appropriate measure of a firm's assets is
the value of total assets at the beginning of the time period in
question (this is equivalent to the total value of a firm's
Spring 1994
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assets at the end of the previous time period).
As Leonard pointed out, most firms claim to link CEO
compensation to firm performance (Leonard, p. 13-S).
Accordingly, compensation should serve as an incentive to improve
performance. Including the various components of compensation
packages as influences on performance may help identify ways in
which to close existing gaps between the often competing goals
facing the CEO, those of personal wealth maximization and the
goals of the firm (shareholders), profit maximization. Annual
base salary, bonuses, stock options and other "long-term" perks
such as health insurance, auto allowances and thrift plan
contributions are used in varying degrees to reward CEOs for
their role in affecting performance. Compensation for one year
serves as incentive for the following year: if performance
increases and the CEO is rewarded with a larger compensation
package, then future performance is more likely to improve; and
if poor performance is accompanied by a similar change in the
compensation package, then future performance is likely to
improve as the CEO takes quick, profit-maximizing action in hopes
of increasing the value of his/her compensation package.
Table 3 shows the explanatory variables and the effects that
they would be expected to have on performance.

TABLE 3.

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

State of the Economy: (+) The SOE is positively related to firm
performance. In general, as the economy improves so does
performance, and when the economy is experiencing a downturn so
too do most companies. Also, how a firm's performance is
impacted by the economy is determined by the type of products or
services in which the firm deals—normal vs. inferior.
Assets: (+ or -) Assets can be an indicator of firm size,
depending on whether economies of scale or diseconomies of scale
are present. As company size increases it is more difficult to
monitor the actions of and the decisions facing the CEO; it is
easier for the CEO to undertake activities that will maximize
his/her own utility instead of maximizing firm performance.
Because of this, it is more difficult and more costly to
establish a compensation package that successfully coordinates
the interests of the CEO with those of the firm. Stock holder
apathy, which also tends to increase as the size of the firm
increases, can also contribute to lower performance—stock
holders are less likely to be aware of CEO compensation and less
likely to get involved in decision making. If larger firms are
expected to be less efficient than their smaller counterparts,
the coefficient for assets is expected to be negative
(diseconomies of scale); if larger firms are more efficient than
their smaller counterparts, the coefficient for assets is
expected to be positive (economies of scale).
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Annual base salary and bonus for CEO (S+B): (+*) Base salary
does vary from year to year, and theoretically it should move in
the direction of firm performance. This tends to be the most
stable portion of a compensation package. Given out annually as
well as other times throughout the fiscal year when performance
figures are announced, bonuses are perhaps the most performancesensitive element of compensation packages. Accordingly,
performance should be sensitive to (S+B)—anticipation of a
larger portion of compensation being in the form of bonuses
should positively influence performance.
Stock options awarded to CEO: (+) Stock options are positively
related to market-based performance measures because,
theoretically, a CEO will increase his/her wealth only if the
firm performs well in the marketplace. Since stock options can
be held for up to ten years before exercising them, it is
possible for a CEO to hold on to them during years of poor
performance and exercise them in the more prosperous future
(Byrne, p. 34). This makes it hard to predict whether or not the
relationship will be statistically significant.
Furthermore, it is possible for CEOs to benefit from options
even when real performance is not improving. This occurs during
periods of inflation or bull markets. A CEO may realize a
significant profit from exercising options while real firm
performance has either not changed or has worsened. Thus, the
suggested incentive provided by stock options appears to be
overstated.
Other components of CEO compensation: (-) Additional elements of
compensation are often referred to as executive "perks". These
are very rarely tied to firm performance. Therefore, they do not
provide an incentive to maximize profit. In fact, some CEOs may
prefer to maximize perks and thereby decrease profits.

III.

EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS:

Since this study is primarily concerned with the ability of
compensation packages to influence firm performance, it will
focus on the following relationship:
PERF(t) = (size, CEO COMPENSATION(t-1))
Cross-sectional data found in the Executive Compensation Surveys
for Corporate America's Most Powerful People as well as those for
The 200 Best Small Companies, published by Forbes, provides a
sample of compensation and corporate performance information for
nearly 1000 CEOs. Using cross-sectional data serves as a control
for the state of the economy (SOE), since all firms will be
observed at the same point in the business cycle. Therefore, SOE
will not be included. This study utilizes compensation and
performance figures for the years of 1989-1991. Forty CEOs were
randomly selected from each survey group with the stipulation
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that the same individual serve as CEO for both 1990 and 1991.
Other performance and asset values were obtained4 from Standard &
Poor's Stock Reports as well as The Market Guide .
Unfortunately, a potential for bias exists because the
Forbes surveys only include the "best" firms; there is a chance
that important relationships may go undetected simply because
certain companies did not make the "A" list. The voluntary nature
of the surveys results in some data not being reported for all
firms. Additionally, large financial institutions were omitted
from this study due to a lack of comparable performance
information. Such inaccessibility to data may hinder the
accuracy of the results.
Prior to the 1992 passage of a SEC regulation, firms had not
been required to report the amount of stock options that were
awarded to their CEOs. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
Forbes data is neither complete nor consistent—the data for
stock options is sometimes listed as a dollar value, at other
times only the number of options is recorded and in some cases
the data is omitted all together. Given the importance of such
options in CEO compensation packages, excluding them from this
study will diminish the explanatory power of the equations
(Peale, p. 1). Furthermore, the Forbes data reports annual
salary and bonuses as one figure. This makes it more difficult
to determine which elements of compensation are most effective in
influencing firm performance.
Table 4 presents a summary of all the variables used during
statistical analysis:
TABLE 4.

VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

Performance measures (current—1991 and lagged—1990);
Return on Assets (ROA): An accounting measure of performance,
ROA is sometimes calculated as (Net Income + Interest)/(Average
total assets for the fiscal year).
Return on Equity (ROE): An accounting measure of performance
that can be calculated as (Net Income - Income to Minority
Interests - Preferred Stock Dividends Paid)/(Average Common Stock
Equity over the fiscal year).
Total Shareholder Return (TSR): This is a market measure of
performance and is calculated as (Dividends per share + Capital
Gain per share)/(Price per share of common stock at the end of
the previous calendar year) (Abowd, pp. 59-S, 60-S).
Change in the performance variables was also tested.
Compensation Variables (current—1991 and lagged—1990);
(Salary + Bonus): (S+B) includes all cash, deferred salary,
bonus payments plus any directors fees and commission; this
variable is measured in millions of dollars.
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Other: Payments from long-term compensation plans, restricted
stock awards (vested or released from restriction), thrift plan
contributions, company-paid health and insurance plans plus any
other benefits such as auto allowances—does not include stock
options. This is measured in millions of dollars.
Total Pay:

(S+B) + (Other); measured in millions of dollars.

Present Value of Total Pay: Total Pay * (l+i)AT; T=70-present
age and i=.03. This assumes that the CEO receives an increment
of (S+B) until age 70, at a discount rate of .03. This is
measured in millions of dollars.
Pay-related Wealth: PRW = Total Pay + pv(Total Pay), and is
measured in millions of dollars.
Both percentage change and change in total compensation were also
analyzed.
Other:
Assets (current and lagged): This is the total value of a firm's
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; measured in millions
of dollars.
Size: A dummy variable for firm size; 1 if large, 0 if small.
This variable, like Assets, is included as a possible way of
controlling for economies of scale.
Dividends (lagged): Dividends (Div) given out per share of
common stock; measured in dollars per share.
Stock Price (lagged): Stock price (SP) per share of common
stock; measured in dollars per share.
Capital gains (lagged):
in dollars per share.

Capital gains (CG) reported; measured

Interaction terms: Interaction variables were created between
the dummy variable for size and the various measures of
compensation.
Statistical results are presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7.
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TABLE 5. Coefficients of regression analysis with t-statistics
given in parentheses. Significance: * = .10, ** = .05 and *** =
.01.
Dependent Variable—ROE(t) (%)
Independent
Variables
SIZE
PRW(t-l)

(1)
OLS
-.1283
(5.654***)

(1)
WLS
-.1408
(6.639***)

.0039
(2.121 **)

.0043
(8.327***)

(S+B)(t-1)

••••

••••

(OTHER)(t-1)

•

• • • s

•

•

•

(2)
OLS
-.1247
(5.650***)
••••

.0113
(2.083 **)
•

C O *

(3)
OLS
-.1237
(5.603***)
••••

.0112
(2.064 **)
-.0016
(0.093

Intercept

.2404

.2397

.2402

.2402

adj. R2

.2762

.9012

.2748

.2653

F-stat

16.074

244.4853

15.9664

10.5102

Sample size

80

80

80

80

)

At first glance the low R2 values of these regressions may
seem to indicate the failure of this model. However, the primary
relationship to be examined is not accounted for by R2. Rather
than trying to account for all of the determinants of
performance, these regressions focus on the effects that firm
size and CEO compensation elements have on performance. For all
three performance measures firm size is negatively related to
performance. This can be seen in the negative coefficients for
the dummy variable for SIZE as well as the variable ASSETS (with
the exception of its insignificantly positive correlation to
TSR). This indicates the presence of diseconomies of scale, and
there are two possible explanations for this. First, the recent
recession has resulted in large-scale corporate down-sizing.
Second, large firms face higher employee-monitoring costs; it
costs more to develop a successful, performance-sensitive CEO
compensation package.
Perhaps most importantly, in all instances compensation
variables have the expected signs. Overall, size and
compensation elements are most successful in affecting ROE.
Their impact on TSR is somewhat lower. These results are just
the opposite of what Abowd found, but that is probably due to the
differences in calculating compensation. Additionally, in light
of the results for autocorrelation correction, the ability of
size and compensation to affect ROA remains questionable.
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TABLE 6. Coefficients of regression analysis with t-statistics
given in parentheses. Significance: * = .10, ** = .05 and *** =
.01.
Dependent Variable—TSR(t)
(return per dollar)
Independent
Variables
SIZE

(4)
OLS
-.3040
(1.635

*)

PRW(t-l)

.0530
(2.096 **)

ch(PRW)

.0525
(1.831

ASSETS(t)
DlV(t-l)
SP(t-l)
CG(t-l)

.0000
( .114
.0438
(.389

*)
)
)

-.0086
(3.047***)

-

-.0106
(2.116 **)

Intercept

.6016

adj. R2

.2019

F-stat

3.7827

Sample size

78

The fact that TSR did not fare as well as ROE as a dependent
variable does not mean that CEO compensation does not affect
shareholder return. It is very likely that the missing stock
options data would fill in this missing link, giving a better
picture of the true relationship between CEO compensation and
TSR. With that data now becoming available, so too is the
opportunity for future research. Such research could enhance the
explanatory power of this study.
Although the results for the regression using ROA as a
dependent variable cannot be viewed as reliable, it is
encouraging that the variables had the theoretically correct
signs. On the other hand, it is surprising that the coefficient
for ASSETS is not significant in either the OLS or the HildrethLu corrected model5.
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TABLE 7. Coefficients of regression analysis with t-statistics
given in parentheses. Significance: * = .10, ** = .05 and *** =
.01.
Dependent Variable—ROA(t) (%)
(5)
Independent
Variables
SIZE
(S+B)(t-1)
ASSETS(t)

OLS

Hildreth-Lu for
Autocorrelation

-.0925
(5.323***)

-.0410
(1.786

*)

.0070
(1.937 **)

.0076
(1.664

*)

-.0000
(1.305

-.0000
(0.992

)

)

Intercept

.1418

.0886

adj. R2

.3605

-.1158

F-stat

13.2119

0.0000

Sample size

66

66

Additional regressions were run using the interaction terms
between firm size and the various compensation elements in order
to test the hypothesis that performance was jointly affected by
size and compensation. The results did not confirm such a
relationship. When regressed against ROE, coefficients for the
interaction terms were negative, which would substantiate the
belief that larger firms are not as successful as small firms at
making CEO compensation sensitive to performance. However, tstatistics were around .337 with prob values of .737. Thus, the
results cannot be viewed as reliable. ROA and TSR regressions
had similarly insignificant results.
By far, the most encouraging results were achieved with the
equations that used ROE as the performance-measuring, dependent
variable. When interpreting the results, it can be seen that in
the WLS version of equation (1) a $1 million increase in PRW(t-l)
brings about an estimated .43% increase in ROE, other things
being equal. Similarly, holding all else constant, a small firm
is expected to have an estimated ROE of 23.97% while its larger
counterpart has an expected ROE of 9.89%. Furthermore, equation
(3) reveals that performance, as measured by ROE, is positively
related to the (S+B) portion of compensation—a $1 million
increase in (S+B), ceteris paribus, brings about a 1.12% increase
in ROE. These results support the theoretical predictions that
were presented earlier. One disappointment, however, is that the
coefficient for the (Other) element of compensation was not
significant.
So, what do these results reveal about the possibility of
influencing firm performance through CEO compensation? All in
68
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all, the results are encouraging. Not only do the results
indicate that performance is significantly affected by CEO
compensation, but they also reveal that performance is influenced
by more than just the level of compensation. In fact, these
results hint at specific ways in which stockholders and boards of
directors can shape compensation packages in order to bring about
better performance on specific performance measures. For
example, it appears that one way in which to increase ROE is to
decrease the amount of compensation that is accounted for by
(Other) components and increase the performance-based (S+B)
portion of compensation. Thus, it is possible to better
coordinate the interests of CEOs with those of shareholders.
Perhaps compensation committees and stockholders alike would
do well to heed Dr. Murphy's advice, "The level of CEO pay is not
an important shareholder [performance-related] issue. The
structure of CEO pay is much more important....The cost of paying
the CEO too much is trivial compared to the cost of paying the
CEO in a way that provides inadequate incentives" (Yates, p. 2 ) .
It is only by recognizing and understanding these important
relationships between CEO compensation and firm performance that
society can take meaningful actions toward resolving this
divisive issue. Hopefully the results of studies such as this
will help to resolve the compensation controversy.
**********

ENDNOTES
1. Jensen and Murphy acquired their data from the Forbes
Executive Compensation Surveys from 1974 to 1986, Standard and
Poor's Compustat data service and the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) (Jensen, p. 228). Instead of using
separate sources for large and small firm data, they merely
considered firms with a market value above the median in the
Forbes surveys to be large, and those below the median to be
small (Jensen, p. 237).
2. Abowd utilized information provided by Standard & Poor's
COMPUSTAT, as well as the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of
Economic Analysis time series (Abowd, p. 68-S—69-S).
3. Abowd's definition of Total Salary only included annual base
salary plus annual bonuses; he did not account for any long-term
components or "perks". Total assets for year t were computed as
total assets at the end of fiscal year t-1. Additionally, the
interaction terms were figured in the following manner: one term
had a value equal to Perf(t)*Comp(t-l) if performance was above
the median performance of firms listed with the NYSE, otherwise;
and the other had a value equal to Perf(t)*Comp(t-l) if
performance was below the median performance of firms listed with
the NYSE, 0 otherwise. Both interaction terms were expected to
be positively correlated with performance(t), assuming that
compensation packages were indeed performance-sensitive (Abowd
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p.58-S).
4.

Data was acquired from the following sources:

ROE:

large,

Moody's

Handbook

of

Common

Stock

small, Forbes survey of The 200 Best Small
Companies
Stock Prices: large, Forbes Executive Compensation Surveys for
America's Most Powerful People
small,

Dividends:

Forbes

large, Forbes
small,

Moody's and

The Market Guide

(data

from

these two sources is comparable)
ROA:

large,
small,

Standard & Poor's Stock Reports
Standard & Poor's and The Market

Guide

(data

from these two sources is comparable)
Total Assets: large, Standard & Poor's
small,

Standard

&

Poor's

and

The Market

Guide

Compensation: large, Forbes
small,

Forbes

5. Unfortunately all of my attempts at manually correcting for
autocorrelation ended in frustration as Y-stat locked up on me.
While I expected the significance of my regression to diminish
after the2 correction, I was very surprised at the drastic change
in both R and the t-statistics as a result of the Hildreth-Lu
correction for autocorrelation. The other automatic correction
produced similar results. Since the variables were fairly
significant before correction, I decided to include them in my
results.
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